Abstract/In this paper we examine the evidence for the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) estimate that the costs of global climate change will be on the order of 1.5-2.0% of world gross domestic product (GDP). Although this estimate is widely and authoritatively repeated, it rests on a handful of preliminary studies, chiefly of the United States and performed by a select group of economists. We examine the methods and assumptions of these studies and consider the social and political commitments built into their analytical techniques. We conclude that the prevailing methods of economic damage assessment and valuation provide a highly conservative estimate of the potential costs and risks of future climate change. We suggest that the IPCC scientific assessment process has been organized in such a way as to foreclose public debate about the moral and political judgments built into the technical details of its reports.
Introduction
The fate of a fact, Bruno Latour (1987, page 59) has provocatively written, is in the hands of later users; its meaning and epistemic status depend upon how it is subsequently represented. Scientific statements, according to Latour, become more or less factual through their successive incorporation of and by other statements. By mobilizing long chains of associated and mutually reinforcing claims, scientists are able to transform weak rhetoric into ever stronger and more authoritative statements, whose truth, if repeated and acted upon enough, can become so indisputable as to be taken for granted. Once this happens and a scientific consensus has been reached, all of the once controversial judgments, assumptions, and techniques that went into establishing a fact tend to fade from view, as they are subsumed into the new corpus of accepted scientific knowledge and practice.
Latour's analysis of scientific citation practice and the modalities of scientific discourse provides an insight into the tremendous authority enjoyed by the pronouncements of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). This body of international scientific experts was established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme to report on the latest scientific knowledge of global climate change. The first arid second assessment reports of its three working groups, devoted to changes in the climate system, their biophysical impacts, and crosscutting socioeconomic issues and policy response options, respectively, summarize massive technical literatures to create "a standard work of reference, widely used by policy-makers, scientists, and other experts" (Bruce et al, 1996, page vii) . In turn, these hefty assessment reports live on chiefly through summaries for policymakers, in which hundreds of pages of scientific and technical writing are boiled down to a few paragraphs drafted by the Secretariat of each working group and approved, line by line, by political Tf Present address: Environmental Adaptation Research Group, Environment Canada and Columbia University, Biosphere 2 Center, 32540 Biosphere Road, Oracle, AZ 85623, USA; e-mail: daler@bio2.edu representatives of member countries. "The resulting Summary for Policymakers is thus an intergovernmentally negotiated text" (Bruce et al, 1996 , page x). The summaries and the synopses often prepared of them are the most common form in which the conclusions of the IPCC are disseminated or, in actual practice, ever discussed in public, by the press, or in policy circles.
The credibility of the IPCC summaries for policymakers depends upon the appearance that they are simply reiterating what has been outlined in greater detail in the full technical reports. The actual assessment reports rely upon this same mode of persuasion. They are commonly presented as reviews of the existing scientific literature rather than as efforts to break new research ground or reach new conclusions, though, of course, the line between reviewing and revising is a fine one. In turn, the act of having been cited by the IPCC confers a certain authority and legitimacy upon its sources. Because the IPCC assessment reports are so prestigious and gather together in a single convenient place the latest scientific information on climate change, they have become the first and, for many, the last word on the science of climate change. Thus, once a particular scientific claim has been repeated by the IPCC.it tends to take on a life of its own. The details of its construction-the technical judgments, uncertainties, and qualifications of its initial formulation-are forgotten when it is represented in the summary for policymakers, the press, and elsewhere as a simple and self-evident scientific fact. This is nowhere more evident than in the IPCC's recent estimate of the economic costs of future climate change impacts and adaptations, which it put at 1.5-2% of world gross domestic product (GDP). These estimates have enormous public policy significance, more so, perhaps, than any other part of the second IPCC assessment report. Although its uncertainty was carefully described by David Pearce et al (1996) in the body of the IPCC report, this little number has solidified and become a standard reference point in the political debate about how to respond to climate change. One of the chief reasons why the Bush administration opposed any mandatory greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions was its belief, based on an influential paper by William Nordhaus (1991) and a study he coauthored for the US National Academy of Sciences (1991) , that the economic impacts of climate change would likely be negligible and thus that the most rational strategy would be to wait and see rather than taking immediate steps to mitigate climate change by reducing GHG emissions (Rowlands, 1995) . As it has commonly been read, the latest IPCC report largely confirms this appraisal of the economic costs of climate change. Accordingly, many in government and policy circles have concluded that little immediate expenditure can be justified to reduce GHG emissions.
In this paper we consider the basis for such a conclusion by examining the climate change damage assessments on which it rests. First, we trace the IPCC damage estimates back to their original sources and show their often narrow and highly uncertain foundations. Although these are acknowledged in the body of the report, they are often lost on readers, who tend to treat the IPCC damage estimates as if they bore the Good Housekeeping stamp of approval. Close scrutiny of the numbers reveals important analytical decisions, which, if not unreasonable themselves, certainly demand fuller and more transparent explanation, especially given the enormous political stakes riding on these estimates. Though presented as an independent review of the literature, it is noteworthy how much the IPCC chapter on the social costs of climate change relies upon the quantitative work of the lead authors themselves, in particular the PhD theses of Samuel Fankhauser and Richard Tol, whose respective supervisors, David Pearce and Pier Vellinga are also lead authors. The composition of the review panel raises questions about the degree to which a narrow selection of economists, largely reviewing their own work, can adequately represent the full range of human understandings of the social costs of climate change. One of the effects of this kind of social and disciplinary insularity is that the informal understandings and presumptions of a small community of investigators may go unquestioned, precisely because they are informal and go without saying. The danger is that those who rely on the results of the IPClC^assessm^^ let alone endorse, the full implications of the technical decisions involved in making them. In the second part of this essay, we highlight some of the more controversial methods and assumptions of climate change damage assessment. Many of these difficulties are discussed in the IPCC report itself or in the specialist literature on which it draws, but the geography of technical knowledge production is such that they are not as widely appreciated as they should be. The paper concludes with some more general comments about the politics of climate change damage assessment.
A genealogy of climate change damage assessment
The art of estimating the social and economic costs of future climate change is a young one, as is the field of environmental economics from which most of its techniques and nearly all of its practitioners hail. The first major attempt to quantify, in monetary terms, the costs and benefits of future climate change is less than a decade old (Smith and Tirpak, 1989) . Although other studies followed suit, they have tended to rely heavily upon this initial study of the United States, if not for actual sectorial cost figures themselves, then for methods and associated assumptions.
As we show in figure 1 , the authors of the IPCC chapter on the costs of climate change were forced to base their estimates upon a relatively small body of economic assessment studies. IPCC estimates of the total costs of climate change for the world and several world regions were taken from Fankhauser (1995a) and Tol (1995) , whose regional, bottom-line estimates are extrapolated from their own sector-by-sector estimates for the USA and Western Europe. In turn, these estimates draw heavily upon similar estimates by Nordhaus (1991 ), William Cline (1992 , and James Titus (1992) , who in turn based their calculations upon Joel Smith and Dennis Tirpak's (1989) report for the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Thus, the IPCC damage assessment Meyer and Cooper (1995) 1 1 l I i Hohmeyer and Gartner (1992) Ayres and Fankhauser (1995a ) Tol (1995 Smith and Tirpak (1989) _^ Tol (1996a) ^^ Figure 1 . A genealogy of monetary climate change damage assessments. Solid lines indicate direct appropriation of previous estimates; dashed lines represent a strong influence; the question mark denotes a presumed relationship. The dotted box identifies those sources used most heavily by Pearce et al (1996) in the text of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) chapter on the social costs of climate change.
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resembles an immense inverted pyramid, whose conclusions are founded upon a single, underlying study Furthermore, the geographical specificity of the USA greatly complicates efforts to extrapolate damage estimates even to other developed countries, let alone developing ones, which, for a host of social, economic, and ecological reasons are differentially vulnerable to climate change (Rothman, 1999) . In this situation, as the IPCC report clearly states, "the similarity of the estimates should not ... be interpreted as evidence of their robustness" (Pearce et al, 1996, page 205) . Unfortunately, many of the people repeating the IPCC estimates have not heeded this warning. Chris Hope and Philip Maul (1996) , for instance, use the range of extant damage estimates as upper and lower bound inputs to their models for optimizing the marginal costs and benefits of GHG emissions, as if these estimates were independent and therefore suitable for the kind of uncertainty analysis to which they subject them.
Of course, the IPCC authors cannot be criticized for the way their work has been interpreted, though perhaps even more might have been done to emphasize the caveats and limitations of these benchmark damage estimates, particularly in the summary for policymakers. Nor, since climate change damage assessment is itself such a new field of study, can Pearce et al (1996) be faulted for fulfilling their charge and repeating the existing monetary damage estimates, however tenuously established they may be.
Just as significant as the work that they decided to review, though, is that which was not included. In figure 1 we show several studies that were omitted from the IPCC tables listing published estimates of the economic costs of climate change. Particularly significant for its absence from these prominent and widely referenced summary tables is Olav Hohmeyer and Michael Gartner's (1992) estimate of US $900 trillion in total damages from a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2). This figure represents total accumulated damages to 2030, so it is not strictly comparable with the benchmark estimates reported by the IPCC (see section 3.1 below), but spreading them out over the forty-year period from 1990 to 2030 (without discounting), still produces an estimate two orders of magnitude greater than any reported by the IPCC No explanation for its omission is provided. In the text, Pearce et al (1996, page 190) do, however, criticize the "ad hoc line of reasoning" of Hohmeyer and Gartner's casuality projections, which they find much too pessimistic compared with the "more sophisticated" estimates of Cynthia Rosenzweig et al (1993) . But similar complaints (see Ayres and Walter, 1991; Daily et al, 1991; Ekins, 1995) have been made about some of the individual sector-by-sector estimates making up the bottom-line estimates of Nordhaus (1991) and Fankhauser (1995a) that do appear in the summary IPCC tables, so these concerns about Hohmeyer and Gartner's casuality figures should not have been decisive.
The omission of the Hohmeyer and Gartner (1992) damage estimate from the final IPCC report is curious because, in another context, two of the lead authors (Fankhauser and Tol, 1995, page 16) have insisted that their role as IPCC authors was not to "take a position" but "merely [to] reflect the literature, and present it in a comprehensive and accessible way". Perhaps its exclusion has to do with Hohmeyer and Gartner's refusal to use regionally differentiated prices in valuing the land and lives lost through climate change, as is customary in economics. Instead, Hohmeyer and Gartner (1992, pages 41 -42) insisted, for reasons of equity, on figuring the costs of global climate change impacts in terms of monetary values derived from developed countries, which are higher than those for other regions or the globally averaged figures sometimes offered as an alternative to unequal regionalized ones (Fankhauser et al, 1997; Pearce et al, 1996, page 197) . This is one of the main reasons why their overall damage estimates are so much higher than those reported by the IPCC. Pearce (1997, page 3) has called the logic for this valuation procedure "deeply flawed" because taken to its logical conclusion it would demand that "The individual with the highest aversion to risk [should] dictate the value to be attached to risk for the entire world population." Such a proposition, of course, violates the fundamental tenets of neoclassical economics in which prices represent the aggregate expression of many individual preferences. In objecting to it, Pearce presumes that some market-like willingness-to-pay measure is the most ap^ -These presumptions, as we discuss below in section 3.6, are bitterly contested by critics of the IPCC report.
The controversy over the objectivity of monetary valuation suggests one reason, perhaps, why Pearce et al (1996) did not report Hohmeyer and Gartner's (1992) results. Whereas their approach to valuing climate change damages was explicitly normative and prescriptive, it seems to us that Pearce (1997, page 3) regards economics as a positive science, committed to reporting the empirical "truth of differing willingness to pay". Pearce has called the use of willingness to pay as "a matter of scientific correctness versus political correctness" (quoted in F Pearce, 1995) and accused those such as Aubrey Meyer and Tony Cooper (1995) , who called for the IPCC to assess the value of global impacts at developed-country price levels, of trying "to hijack an essentially scientific process for political and ideological ends" (Pearce, 1996, page 8) . We can only assume that Hohmeyer and Gartner's prescriptive approach to valuation was disqualified from the IPCC report on similar grounds.
In addition to these questions about the range and choice of damage estimates reported by the IPCC, we also have some concerns about the actual numbers themselves and the abbreviated, if not opaque, descriptions provided of the methods used and assumptions made in calculating them. Table 6 .4 of the IPCC chapter on the social costs of climate change provides several different estimates of monetized (in 1990 dollars) damages to the present US economy from a doubling of C0 2 (Pearce et al, 1996, page 203) . Included are estimates by Fankhauser (1995a) , whose figures were originally given in 1988 dollars. Although it is not stated, one would assume that Fankhauser's original numbers had simply been scaled up to 1990 dollars, using the standard price deflators for GDP (Council for Economic Advisors, 1994), which, when calculated, yield a value of 1.09. However, comparing the numbers presented in Pearce et al (1996, page 213) and the original Fankhauser (1995a) figures yield factors ranging from 1.14 (agriculture and species loss) to 1.20 (migration), depending upon the sector considered. Irrespective of questions about the inconsistency of the factor used for different sectors, the conversion factors used by Pearce et al (1996) fall outside the range of the standard factor determined by using the implicit price deflators for GDP. No explanation for these discrepancies is provided.
In the same table, Pearce et al (1996, page 213 ) present estimates from Tol (1995) , which though originally given in 1988 dollars have not been scaled up to 1990 dollars like the other figures in the table.
(1) Although Tol (1995) is given as the authority for the estimates published by the IPCC, this paper simply reproduces numbers from two earlier unpublished working papers [only one of which (Tol, 1993a) is actually listed in the references], without explaining the basis for them. Some limited explanation of Tol's methods and assumptions is provided in his thesis (Tol, 1996a, page 120) , where he indicates that the basic numbers given in Tol (1995) were worked out in another unpublished working paper (Tol, 1993b) . It troubles us that the damage estimates made (1) It would also appear that a misprint of Tol's original (1995) figure for human life has been corrected by Pearce et al (1996) , because the total in Pearce et al (1996) is correct whereas that in Tol's (1995) article is not. In his thesis Tol (1996a, page 109) does mention that he has corrected a typographical error in Tol (1995) , but based upon the exact duplication in his thesis (Tol, 1996a , page 120) of the sectorial numbers given in his 1995 article, including the original figure for human life, it would seen that he is referring to some other error. Tol's (1996a) thesis depart so much from those provided by Tol (1995) and cited in the IPCC report. As we show in table 1, his revised estimate of the costs of species loss for the United States has nearly quadrupled, whereas the estimate of mortality losses has dropped by nearly 75%. A reader could be forgiven for wondering about the soundness of the damage estimates presented by the IPCC if one of the lead authors of the chapter felt called upon to revise them so substantially in the few short months after the completion of the IPCC report in late 1995. Similar concerns arise in retracing the work of Nordhaus, whose views have been influential both in the press (Nordhaus, 1990a) and in US policymaking circles (Rowlands, 1995) . IPCC table 6.4 presents damage figures from Nordhaus's (1991) "To slow or not to slow", scaled from 1981 dollars up to 1990 dollars (Pearce et al, 1996, page 203) . We find this surprising, as Nordhaus had revised his 1991 estimates for his (1994) book Managing the Global Commons. Neither the book nor the article provide much information about how his estimates were derived. The book cites the paper in which the reader is told that the "data on impacts are summarized in EPA (1988) . Translation into national-income accounts by author. Details are available on request" (Nordhaus, 1991, page 932 , note in table 6). A little more explanation about his sources and methods is provided by Nordhaus's (1990b) discussion paper of the same name, but it is still insufficient for reproducing his results. For example, Nordhaus (1990b, table 7) indicates that his estimate of US$1.65 billion ($1981) for increased electricity demand is taken from table 16-1 in EPA (1988, pages 16-18) , but this figure does not appear in this table. We are not alone in our frustration. Cline (1992, page 113) has also described his unsuccessful attempt to reproduce Nordhaus's estimate. Without the documentation necessary to replicate these figures, readers are forced to accept them on faith alone.
We have presented these concerns in some detail, because much rests on the credibility of these various estimates of climate change costs to the United States. As mentioned previously, they are by far the most detailed sectorial damage estimates produced to date and provide much of the empirical basis for extrapolating globalscale damage estimates. By referring back to this body of apparently well-founded US work, the global damage estimates seem much more trustworthy and certain than they otherwise would. Indeed, the very frequency of their citation has served to increase their credibility and to discourage much consideration of the details of their construction. Confronted with such long chains of nested and mutually supportive references, readers are led to accept a scientific claim because it seems so well established in the literature as to be incontrovertible (Latour, 1987, pages 50 -58) . Practitioners often know otherwise; personal familiarity with the analytical techniques, assumptions, or even the identity of the scientists in question gives them a basis for qualifying their faith in scientific claims. But the intimate craft knowledge that makes it possible for experts to assess the judgments built into particular claims is unavailable^to^those^more removed from their original production, especially when so much of the foundational work circulates in unpublished (and unreviewed) working papers and other gray literature among a select, 'invisible college' of economic analysts of climate change.
This geography of scientific knowledge production and dissemination tends to create what Donald MacKenzie (1990, page 373) has called the certainty trough (see also Bijker, 1995; Shackley and Wynne, 1995) , which is illustrated in figure 2. Without the expertise necessary to question the methods and assumptions of the economic damage assessments, most readers of the IPCC report are forced either to take them or leave them. Although many members of the general public mistrust the entire effort to place a monetary value on the impacts of climate change, those in policy circles seeking a basis for making complex and contentious public policy decisions tend to put greater confidence in the outputs of cost-benefit analysis than do those who performed the underlying analyses and are better versed in their uncertainties and limitations. This situation and the extraordinary temptation simply to take the numbers as given and run with them tend to reduce the effectiveness of whatever caveats and cautions may be provided. g high
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Those directly Those committed to Those alienated involved in the applications of a from the scientific knowledge scientific program or program or production institution, but users institution or rather than producers committed to of knowledge a different one In the case of climate change damage assessment, the certainty trough has led to all sorts of misinterpretations, notwithstanding the efforts of Pearce et al (1996) to emphasize their uncertainty. Estimates of the costs of climate change have been catapulted into the heated debate about how much (or even whether) to reduce GHG emissions, where they are often deployed without much discussion of the uncertainties or large disagreements over the individual sector-by-sector estimates making up any bottom-line figures (Demeritt and Rothman, 1998) . Even in academic circles it is not uncommon to see damage estimates used as input for policy-optimization models, despite the extraordinary heterogeneity of the GHG mitigation, adaptation expenditure, and residual damage estimates that are being compared and optimized in these models (Hasselmann et al, 1996; Hope and Maul, 1996) . Such academic exercises are only loosely connected to government decisionmaking, it is true. But the rise of integrated assessment modeling and the pressure from government funding bodies to make academic research ever more policy-relevant promises to make these economic models and the climate change damage assessments they rely upon much more important in determining future policy outcomes. Pearce (1997) has noted another all too common misunderstanding of the IPCC report, which stems from the way the summary for policymakers was written. By describing climate change damage as "a few percent of world GDP" and the "costs of substantial reductions [in GHG emissions] ... as high as several percent of GDP", the summary for policymakers (Bruce et al, 1996, pages 10, 14) invited readers to believe that these two figures were strictly comparable and thus to conclude, mistakenly, that the IPCC report provided little economic justification for reducing GHG emissions. In fact, as Pearce (1997) notes, the benefits of GHG reduction are substantially greater than simply the avoided costs of the damages cited by the IPCC both because: (1) the IPCC mostly cites damage costs for an effective doubling of CO2 and if present trends continue atmospheric concentrations and resulting climate change damages will be very much higher, and (2) the damage costs exclude such secondary benefits of GHG reduction as reduced air pollution, which Pearce et al (1996, pages 215 -218 ) describe at some length.
As Pearce's story suggests, MacKenzie's certainty trough is something of a misnomer. Uncertainty is not the only aspect of the cost numbers that has been effectively black boxed and hidden from view by the geography of their construction, in private, by a small community of investigators, and subsequent dissemination into the wider public sphere. Although Pearce et al (1996) and the IPCC more generally have struggled mightily with the challenge of communicating their level of confidence in their scientific assessments across the science-policy interface (Shackley and Wynne, 1995; , much less attention has been devoted to other aspects of climate change impact assessment that have a bearing on understanding its objects and limitations. Monetary damage estimates embody a number of important presumptions and judgments. The legitimacy and credibility of these analytical practices are negotiated by relatively small communities of investigators. The danger is that policymakers and others committed to using the cost numbers may not fully appreciate, let alone endorse, all of the interpretive judgments and informal understandings built into them.
The practice of climate change damage assessment
In this section we consider some of the more important methodological presumptions and techniques of climate change damage assessment. Many of these problems have been noted in the IPCC report itself or in the specialist literature on which it is based, but their implications have not been widely appreciated outside of the small economic damage assessment community. Indeed, the desperate enthusiasm with which the damage estimates have been taken up has served to sideline important questions about their underlying foundations and political implications. This is particularly clear in the case of assigning monetary values to human mortality losses, but it is no less true of other, more technical, aspects of economic damage assessment. It is our contention that the overall effect of these practices has been to impose a systematic downward bias to our sense of the potential costs and full human meaning of future climate changes.
Benchmark estimates
Most estimates of the costs of climate change are based upon a present-day benchmark. That is, they ask what the difference in GDP would be between the present economy under the present climate versus the present economy under a future climate. This method of imposing a changed climate onto the present economy makes it easier to tease out the specific differences that a changed climate might make. However, the price of analytical tractability is realism.
The costs of climate change to a future society, with a population perhaps twice the size of the present population, will likely be very different from those to the present society. There are serious questions, for instance, about the ability of food production to continue keeping pace with the rate of population increase (Brown, 1995) , suggesting that future societies may be much more vulnerable to climate change. On the other hand, economic growth in developing countries may reduce their dependence on vulnerable natural resource sectors. This has led some to suggest that the best response to the threat of climate change would be to increase the pace of global industrial and economic development, because, in the aggregate, "wealthier is healthier and richer is safer" (Lewis, 1997, page 15; Schelling, 1992) . Although economic growth may tend to reduce the share of the global economy directly impacted by climate change, Tol (1994) has shown that it can also greatly increase the monetary value of damages to intangible goods such as scenery. He bases this conclusion on the assumption that persons with higher incomes place a greater value on these amenities. It is difficult to gauge whether, on balance, these different trends make the benchmark estimates high or low.
As a snapshot estimate of the costs of a changed climate, benchmark estimates effectively ignore the costs of adapting to the climate as it changes. These can be substantial, but investment in adaptation can also reduce the overall costs of climate change. Some adaptation costs, such as for dikes and other sea-level protection measures, have been included in benchmark damage estimates, but most have not. The difficulty of accounting for adaptation is an important, if widely acknowledged, source of uncertainty in the damage literature. For instance, Reilly et al (1994) have argued that, by assuming such farm-level adaptations as changing planting dates and crop switching, the estimated global losses from agricultural impacts can be reduced from a range of US$0.1 billion to US$61.2 billion, without adaptation, to a range from potential gains of US $7.0 billion to losses of only US $37.6 billion. They do not estimate the costs of these adaptations, so they are presumed to be costless, which accords with a widespread view that adaptation happens "through the automatic [and presumably, therefore, cost-free] response of people, institutions, and markets" (Nordhaus, 1991, page 928) . Clearly, this is an optimistic assumption as the effectiveness and even the possibility of adaptation will depend crucially upon the rate of climate change and the ability to anticipate these changes appropriately.
In a simple theoretical model, Tol (1996b) demonstrates how assumptions about rates of climate change and the speed of damage restoration and adaptation have a significant effect on cost estimates. Most notably, he shows that the rate of change can dominate the level of change in determining impact costs for most categories of damage. This effort to account for the rate as well as the level of climate change and the bounded rationality of agents represents an important advance in efforts to estimate the potential costs of adaptation. But, like most of the economic literature, it presumes socially optimal outcomes and does not account for the possibility of strategic or selfish behavior. If the success of beachfront property owners in the USA at financing what are essentially private beach-restoration projects out of the public purse is any indication, the transaction and adaptation costs associated with climate change are likely to be both very high and substantially suboptimal (Davis, 1995) .
Beyond a doubling
Almost all of the existing damage estimates are based on a scenario of climate changed by an effective doubling of atmospheric CO2. But if present trends continue, atmospheric concentrations will double by some time in the middle of the next century and continue to rise thereafter. By limiting the analysis to the case of an effective doubling of CO2, the benchmark estimates neglect the effects of these larger changes in climate. Pearce et al (1996) note that damages are likely to increase more than proportionally with changes in climate. And yet the political debate about global warming has been fixated upon the impacts of a doubling of CO2, as if GHG concentrations and associated damages will magically stop there, rather than continuing to increase.
3.3 Incomplete accounting Anthony Fisher and Michael Hanemann (1993, page 136) have described "a process of winnowing" in the assessment of climate change damages. Although it is widely recognized that the effects of climate change will be many and diverse, economic impact studies have tended to focus more on market goods and services, whose economic value is measured in standard markets, than on intangible and nonmarket goods. These limitations are acknowledged in the fine print of the IPCC technical report, but are not widely appreciated outside of the research community. It does not help, of course, that in the summary of their IPCC chapter, Pearce et al (1996, page 183) provide their "central estimate of global damages, including nonmarket impacts, ... of 1.5-2.0% of world GNP" (our italics), but do not emphasize how incomplete an accounting this represents.
Despite the concentration of research to date on the assessment of market impacts, Pearce et al (1996, page 186) note that nonmarket costs make up "between 30-80%) of the total" in existing estimates of the costs of climate change. Nonmarket impacts at least partially assessed to date include human mortality, migration, air and water pollution, hurricane damage, as well as coastal wetland loss due to sea-level rise, forest loss, and some associated species loss. Robert Costanza et al (1997) list seventeen key services provided by natural ecosystems, few of which have been considered in economic studies of climate change/ 2 ) A more complete accounting of the costs of impacts to these ecosystems services as well as to the many other nonmarket goods not yet accounted for would greatly increase the magnitude of projected climate change damages.
Beyond simply excluding many of them from the analysis, there are two other reasons to suggest that damages to nonmarket goods have been greatly underestimated. Many of these impacts, such as extinctions, are irreversible. As Graciela Chichilnisky and Geoffrey Heal (1993) and Fisher and Hanemann (1993) have argued, under conditions of uncertainty the option value of protecting something from irreversible harm increases substantially. Fisher and Hanemann (1986) demonstrate that the option value of preserving a site that later proved to contain a valuable species could comprise anywhere from one tenth to two thirds of the expected benefits of its preservation. Such option values have not been explicitly included in any study of climate change damages, thereby introducing a downward bias to them. Indeed, as the IPCC report indicates , page 189), only a fraction of the direct use values potentially affected by climate change have as yet been accounted for, to say nothing of the indirect use values, option, existence, and other nonuse values comprising an economist's definition of total economic value. Furthermore, Tol (1994) argues that the common (Pearce et al, 1989 ) assumption of substitutability among all goods reduces the value ascribed to intangible nonmarket goods. By treating goods (both tangible and nontangible) as nonsubstitutable in the production function and allowing for an increased willingness to pay for nonmarket goods because of projected income increases, he shows that the costs of climate change may be significantly higher than commonly represented.
(2) Costanza et al (1997) do include climate regulation as one of their seventeen ecosystem services and rely on some of the climate change analyses noted here for their estimates of its value. We are indebted to Tol for this point. It is important to note that the Costanza study is not concerned with the impacts that a changing climate might have upon this regulatory process or on the other sixteen ecosystem services, as would be proper for a climate change impact assessment.
GDP measures and higher order effects
Existing damage estimates do not take account of many important interactions and interdependencies. This is principally because they are derived from independently calculated sectorial damage estimates that are then aggregated to produce national or global totals. Following this logic, prominent economists such as Nordhaus (1990a; 1991) and Thomas Schelling (1992) have argued that the impact of climate change on advanced industrial economies will be "negligible" (Schelling, 1992 , page 6) because only 3% of US national income comes from sectors that are "highly sensitive" (Nordhaus, 1991, page 930) to climate.
The example of agriculture indicates some of the difficulties of this approach. Because agriculture comprises roughly 1-2% of GDP in developed countries, such as the United States, a complete destruction of agriculture would register as only a 1 -2% GDP loss in standard measures of climate change damages, despite the fact that, as Cline (1992, page 87) notes, "If world agricultural production fell to zero, so would world population. The economic loss would equal the entirety of GDP, not just the ex ante share."
The interdependencies of the economic system-of which agriculture is only the most obvious example-mean that impacts to vulnerable sectors can be propagated to the wider economy, indirectly affecting other sectors with no apparent vulnerability to climate change. Consider the insurance industry, which Nordhaus (1991, page 930) categorizes along with financial services as "negligibly affected by climate change". Almost all economic activities are predicated upon the availability of insurance to reduce risk. If the insurance industry is severely affected by climate change, other sectors will face increasing costs that a static benchmark damage estimate is unable to account for (Tol, 1996c) . Of course, the propagation of impacts to the wider economy works the other way as well, serving to dampen the economic effects of climate change. Somewhat surprisingly, given the structure of many of the existing studies of mitigation costs, almost no studies of climate change have taken a more general equilibrium approach to estimating the economic impacts of climate change. Joel Scherega et al (1993) made a stab at this, using a dynamic equilibrium model of the USA and calculating impacts to agriculture, coastal protection, and electricity consumption. Their preliminary analysis shows that the cost of impacts considered together is greater than the sum of the individual impacts (see also Howarth and Monahan, 1992) .
Aside from the dependencies on other sectors, there is a further problem in that the market prices reflected in national income accounts, such as GDP, are a measure of the marginal utility, that is, the utility of the last unit of a good consumed. For food and other goods with a price-inelastic demand, the utility of the first unit consumed is very much higher, and "the value lost from a cutback in availability will be understated if the quantity loss is evaluated at the original (ex ante) price" (Pearce et al, 1996, page 186) . The appropriate measure of welfare loss is therefore lost consumer surplus, not present-day prices and shares of national income, as used by Nordhaus (1991) . This is duly noted byPearce et al (1996) , but its distributional implications are not clearly drawn out, in part because the discussion of equity and social considerations was split off from the assessment of damage costs. As Tariq Banuri et al (1996, pages 98-99) note elsewhere in the IPCC report, "Any aggregation that evaluates and aggregates impacts in relation to national wealth (such as impacts on World Product, plus nonmarket impacts related to national GNPs) in effect yields the result that the impact is less significant if it is poor people, or people in poorer countries, who suffer".
Finally, as GDP-denominated measures, benchmark damage estimates only capture changes in the flow of goods and services. Effects on capital stocks are partially accounted for insofar as the flow of income from an acre of inundated land is lost, but this tends to understate the long-term welfare loss. The net present value of the future worth of an asset may be only partially reflected in its market price, because of imperfect knowledge, incomplete accounting, and the notorious difficulty of capturing all the public benefits of an asset in terms of what private individuals would be willing to pay for it. Such concerns with the inadequacies of market-based measures of environmental impacts have led Gretchen Daily et al (1991) to conclude that GDPdenominated estimates of the costs of climate change are significantly understated because they do not account for potential impacts to the natural capital stocks that ultimately provide the material underpinnings for the continued future productivity of economic capital. Fisher and Hanemann (1993, pages 142 -143) suggest that the effects of climate change on capital stocks may prove to be "some of the most important" because of the potential "crowding out" of new investment by replacement investment. These higher order effects of climate change on capital stocks, capital productivity, and future reinvestment flows are not accounted for in the benchmark damage estimates.
Best guess versus expected values
Although the possibility for climate surprises and catastrophic impacts is widely acknowledged, almost all of the existing cost estimates are based on so-called best guesses of the impacts of an effective doubling of atmospheric CO2 concentrations. In figure 3 we illustrate the difficulty with this approach. Many of the uncertainties related to climate change have large right-hand tails, with many low-probability-high-cost outcomes possible. In such a situation, as Fankhauser (1995a, pages 23-24) notes, the costs associated with the best guess, that is, the occurrence with the highest (apparent) probability, are significantly lower than those for many (apparently) unlikely scenarios of climate catastrophe. They are also lower than the expected values that would be derived by taking an average, weighted by probability, of all the various cost scenarios. Tol (1995) reports that expected damages calculated in this fashion can be up to a factor of fifty larger than best guesses. In effect, the focus on best guesses downplays the incalculable risk of very costly catastrophe scenarios as well as the possibility of unanticipated impacts and surprises. It introduces a thoroughly political judgment-that it is prudent to focus first on the most likely events and only worry about the risk of catastrophe afterwards-into an ostensibly objective and apolitical analysis. Furthermore, it institutionalizes the informal judgments built into these best guesses and raises the stakes of any climate change mitigation and adaptation policy (or lack of one) founded upon them.
Because the best guess estimates represent economists' best guesses of the economic costs of what, in their view, are the most likely biophysical impacts of the most likely climate changes, it is worth considering their qualifications to make these judgments. Although in figure 3 we present the probability of different cost scenarios in a single dimension, best guess estimates are really composites of three distinct and uncertain judgments: uncertainty about the rate and magnitude of future climate changes, uncertainty about their biophysical impacts, and uncertainty about the economic costs of these environmental changes. Of the three, only the last is an area in which economists can claim any special expertise.
Given these different kinds of uncertain judgment and the different varieties of expertise necessary to make them, the result of Nordhaus's (1994b) survey of expert opinion on the economic costs of climate change is particularly interesting. Estimates ranged from 0 to 21% of global GDP, with a distribution that nicely reflects the problem of expected values versus best guesses. The mathematical average of his nineteen estimates was 3.6% of global GDP, and the median or 'best guess' value was only 1.9%, indicating a large positive skew in the distribution of estimates. Even more suggestive is the fact that the natural scientists interviewed by Nordhaus (1994b, page 49) rated the potential costs and risks of climate change much more seriously than "mainstream" economists who Best guess (mode) Costs Figure 3 . A hypothetical climate change damage function, relating estimated damage costs to their probability, which might be assessed either by a single investigator or by combining various expert judgments (compare Titus and Narayanan, 1996) . The 'best guess' represents the cost outcome considered most likely; the expected value is an average of all possible cost outcomes weighted by probability; and the worst cases are the high costs associated with (apparently) unlikely scenarios of climate catastrophe (after Fankhauser, 1995a, page 24).
"were comparatively unconcerned". Of course, in past debates over the prospects of timber famine a century ago (Demeritt, 1996, pages 124-219) and, more recently, over the limits to growth, natural scientists underestimated the power of the market to stimulate technical and other advances to overcome apparently natural limits, so perhaps the economists will be right again. On the other hand, as consumers of natural science knowledges, standing in the certainty trough (figure 2), economists estimating the costs of future climate change may well be less cognizant of the tacit assumptions, uncertainties, and indeterminacies built into natural science understandings of climate change than are the scientists more immediately involved in producing these knowledges. Most of the economic impact assessments, for example, are predicted upon relatively modest (2.5 -4°C) increases in average annual temperature, without much consideration of its seasonal and regional distribution or the changing frequency of (presently) extreme events. This represents a greatly simplified and in this sense optimistic assessment of what future climate change may hold in store.
Willingness to pay and the valuation of impacts
In the IPCC and most of the economic studies upon which it is based, the monetary value of climate change damages has been figured in terms of willingness to pay (WTP) rather than willingness to accept compensation (WTA) or some other socially negotiated figure. These different approaches to valuation are controversial, both because they yield very different damage estimates and because they proceed from very different philosophical presumptions. WTA generally yields much higher monetary damage estimates than WTP, principally because WTA bids are not as constrained by income, and the use of a negotiated or prescribed figure dispenses entirely with the idea that valuation should be a process of scientifically measuring and aggregating individual preferences. There is a massive literature on these different approaches to valuation that we cannot hope to address here. Rather, we want to highlight the political implications of the analytical choice of WTP. First, it is worth demonstrating why this is necessarily apolitical choice and not simply a technical one that follows ineluctably from some self-evident economic logic, as Fankhauser (1995b) , Fankhauser and Tol (1995) , and Pearce (1996; have insisted.
A whole set of social and political relations are inscribed into WTA and WTP measures of social and economic value. WTA measures presume that the inhabitants of small island states have the positive right to enjoy the status quo, that is, the existence of their homeland. A WTA-based valuation would ask what kind of hypothetical compensation payment would be required to get them to give up this right. WTP measures proceed in a very different normative context. They assume no inherent right to enjoy the good being valued, thereby putting the onus on the inhabitants of small island states to 'purchase' their island homes, by saying how much they would be willing to pay in order to prevent them from being inundated by rising sea levels. Thus, WTP is an inappropriate measure because climate change does not involve the evaluation of some new or previously unavailable good for which consumers might reasonably be asked how much extra they would be willing to pay (Bromley, 1995) . More significantly, the use of WTP involves an implicit adjudication of fundamental human rights. By valuing the impacts of climate change in terms of WTP, it is assumed that climate change impacts should be evaluated as if the right to emit damaging GHG gases took precedence over the right of affected parties to be free from their environmental impacts. Although it might be responded that this simply acknowledges the status quo, this does not make the choice any more value neutral. Because the implicit property-rights context of contingent-valuation exercises have such an influence on the end results, the choice of WTP or any other measure can never be a politically neutral one.
Market-based valuation measures, such as WTP and WTA, discriminate against the poor. Because they have less income, the WTP bids of poor people and poor regions are generally presumed to be lower than those of wealthier ones less limited by income [though see Brechin and Kempton (1994) whose survey found that WTP to protect the environment was actually higher in poorer developing countries such as Mexico, Uruguay, and India than in wealthier developed countries such as Finland and Japan]. The same holds for WTA measures of value, though for a slightly different reason. WTA bids are positively correlated with income because the marginal utility of income declines with increasing wealth-which is an antiseptic way of explaining why the poor are more likely to 'choose' risks unacceptable to those whose wealth gives them other options. As a result of these income effects, market-based valuation measures, such as WTP and WTA, suggest that unit for unit the impacts of climate change are worth less if they affect poor people or people in poorer regions of the world.
Despite these ethical concerns, the global climate change damage estimates cited by Pearce et al (1996) assigned monetary values to the impacts of climate change according to regionally unequal and starkly income-biased WTP measures. In table 2 we present the different regional values used by Fankhauser (1995a) in making the damage estimates reported by the IPCC. By Fankhauser's reckoning, the loss of 40 420 km 2 of dryland in wealthy OECD countries is worth US $8840 million or US $2 million km" 2 , whereas 99 500 km 2 of lost dryland in less developed, non-OECD countries is assessed at only US $594 000 km -2 (Fankhauser, 1995a, pages 30 -31) . (3) The disparity is even greater for sectors such as water where the ratio of OECD to non-OECD unit prices is not three or four to one, but closer to twenty to one. Although the inadequacies and downward bias involved with the use of WTP-based measures for the valuation of land loss and other damages have been criticized in the technical literature (see Ayres and Walter, 1991, pages 243-247; Ekins, 1995, page 233) , they have not attracted much public notice.
Instead, most of the public debate about WTP and the differential valuation of damages in developed and developing countries has focused on the value of statistical lives (VOSL). Because incomes and thus WTP are higher in developed than in developing countries, Pearce et al (1996) used a VOSL figure fifteen times higher for developed OECD countries than for developing non-OECD countries. Although their technical choice of (3) The value of non-OECD dryland loss is calculated by subtracting the value of OECD dryland loss from the world total and dividing this figure by the volume of world dryland lost less OECD dryland lost. Cline (1992, page 109) estimated this annual rate of return on lost dryland at 10%, a figure used by Fankhauser (1995a, page 31). VOSL was evidently sanctioned by the peer reviewers, it was fiercely criticized when it became public knowledge (Douthwaite, 1995; Lean, 1995; Wysham, 1994) . The authors and IPCC officials (see Bruce, 1995) tried to explain that VOSL does not purport to represent the value of individual lives, simply aggregate individual WTP to avoid risk of death, but it was precisely this reduction in VOSL figures of the value of individual human lives to a question of individual WTP that critics found so offensive. Many called for the complete withdrawal of the chapter from the IPCC report unless Pearce and the other authors agreed to change their VOSL figures (Masood, 1995; Meyer, 1995a) , which they refused to do. The second assessment report was only approved after a last-minute closed-door compromise, in which government representatives agreed to wording in the summary for policymakers that disavowed much of the contents of the Pearce et al (1996) chapter on the social costs of climate change (Douthwaite, 1995; Masood and Ochert, 1995) . In the heat of debate, three distinct concerns about the IPCC report and its approach to VOSL became conflated and confused: WTP over WTA; regionally differentiated VOSLs; and the evaluation of impacts in terms of descriptive market-like prices rather than prescribed monetary values. Critics such as Aubrey Meyer of the Global Commons Institute, the London-based environmental group that led the charge against the IPCC damage report, freely mixed all three criticisms, alternatively calling for the IPCC to value all human mortality loss in terms of WTA (Meyer, 1995b) , a globally equal VOSL figure (Meyer, 1995a) , or prescriptively in terms of universally applied OECD-level VOSLs (Meyer and Cooper, 1995) . Although WTA measures would, undoubtedly, have yielded much higher damage values, they too would have been regionally differentiated, because the marginal utility of income is lower in developed than in developing countries. The observation of Pearce etal (1996) that a globally averaged WTP figure for VOSL makes little difference to the size of global damages from human mortality hardly mollified their critics for whom the real issue is whether a market-based process, which conceals gross inequalities of circumstance in the apparent equality of the exchange relationship, is even an appropriate framework for evaluating the effects of global climate change. Critics advanced a variety of arguments for prescriptively applying the higher OECD values to VOSL worldwide, such as compensation at polluter rates, moral imperative, and diplomatic convenience (Ekins, 1995; Hohmeyer and Gartner, 1992; Meyer and Cooper, 1995) .
In response to their critics, the lead authors of the IPCC damage chapter have provided two explanations for their valuation of climate change impacts in terms of descriptive WTP measures. First, they said they used WTP because this is what was in the literature. Pearce (quoted in Masood, 1995) explained, "Our remit [from the IPCC] was to describe what the literature says, not to rewrite it, nor do original research". This response seems rather odd to us when it is remembered both that the lead authors were themselves responsible for producing most of the estimates reported by the IPCC and that they did not mention Hohmeyer and Gartner's (1992) prescriptively derived damage estimate in their report. Second, Fankhauser and Tol (1995; see also Fankhauser et al, 1997) have argued that the best way to handle equity concerns over differential WTP is not by prescriptively "tinkering with the value system but by giving different weights to different regions in the aggregation process" (page 17). To this end, Pearce et al (1996, page 197) added a sidebar to their chapter showing how equity weighting might be done. Such a suggestion, however, implies that money is a legitimate and politically neutral measure of social value and thus that political values and judgments only enter the equation when it comes to what we make of monetary valuations. These premises are not universally shared.
Indeed, it is the meaning of value and associated process of valuation that most divides Pearce et al (1996) from their critics. True to their neoclassical roots, the IPCC economists believe that the social and economic value of things is expressed in terms of aggregate individual willingness to pay. This utilitarian view of value has been subjected to a number of different philosophical critiques: that it is anthropocentric and ignores intrinsic value (Leopold, 1966) ; that the world cannot be broken down into discrete and alienable entities to which monetary values might meaningfully be attached (Norgaard, 1985) ; that it confuses values and preferences (Sagoff, 1988) ; that its narrow decisionist framework artificially abstracts information about human values and preferences from an ongoing and multidimensional social process of (re)expressing them (Wynne, 1997) ; that money conceals a profound asymmetry in the apparent equality of the exchange relation (Harvey, 1996) . Each of these various theories of value proceed from contentious and deep-seated moral and philosophical beliefs. The choice of valuation procedure, therefore, like the definition of value itself, is ultimately a political one. The use of descriptive market-based prices can be considered no less normative or value laden a choice than the use of prescribed values for VOSL, as Fankhauser et al (1997) seem to imply by distinguishing between the scientific process of estimating the economic costs of climate change impacts and a political and valueladen decision to 'correct' these estimates through aggregation weightings that account for income effects and other equity considerations.
There may well be good reasons to value "the costs of building a sea wall in India ... at local rates" for the purposes of an economic damage assessment (Fankhauser and Tol, 1995, page 17) , but it is important to recognize several things about this analytical choice. First, this descriptive market-based approach is by no means the only or the natural and scientific one. There are other ways to think about valuing the social costs of climate change. Second, any process of valuation is necessarily political, both because it involves making value-laden judgments about what to value and how to value it and also because these analytical choices are implicated in their political applications. Although VOSL estimates may not put a price on individual human lives directly, their purpose is to inform cost-benefit analyses that will. Political and financial decisions about how many lives to put at risk depend heavily upon the value ascribed to these human mortality risks in impact assessments such as that made by the IPCC. Finally, it is important in this regard to be frank about the distributional implications of a market-based WTP valuation of the costs of climate change. This measure puts a steep downward bias on our appreciation of the human costs of future climate changes to the poor and the inhabitants of developing countries, who have not only done the least to cause global warming but will also be the most severely affected by it. 4 Conclusion Our intention in this essay has been to shed some light on the prevailing IPCC estimate that the costs of global climate change will be on the order of 1.5-2.0% of world GDP. Although this figure is often cited, its significance and limitations are not widely ulidefstoodrThe IPCC~estimate~is based on a very-small number of preliminary studies, chiefly of the United States and performed by a small and select group of economists. Not only are other estimates very much higher than those reported by the IPCC, but the IPCC damage estimates are based upon a number of simplifying and by no means unimpeachable assumptions and techniques. Many important climate change impacts have been omitted altogether or, as in the case of agriculture, accounted for in such a way as to downplay higher order economic effects and social welfare implications. Furthermore, as best guess estimates, the IPCC damage figures are also lower than expected cost estimates that formally incorporate risk premiums to account for apparently unlikely but undoubtedly expensive outcomes. Such an approach would be difficult in the case of climate change, where the probability of different outcomes is unknown or even unknowable [but see Titus and Narayanan (1996) for a preliminary attempt], but the comparison emphasizes the downward bias ^ .^_-•p-fgyaiiing techniques of damage assessment. They provide a very imperfect and understated sense of the costs and risks of continued GHG emissions.
Nevertheless, in the debate over how best to respond to climate change, the IPCC central damage estimate is often compared, explicitly or implicitly, with the projected costs of reducing GHG emissions (Decanio, 1997; New York Times 1992; Suzuki and Battle, 1997) . This is a comparison of apples and oranges, as Pearce (1997) has ruefully noted, based upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the IPCC report. Although Pearce attributes the confusion to the internal division of labor within the IPCC and the separate treatment of mitigation and damage costs, we have suggested a different explanation. In our view, these misunderstandings stem from the articulation of the IPCC scientific assessment with wider social and political processes. Important understandings of the damage estimates and their meaning have been black boxed and hidden from view by the geography of scientific knowledge production and its subsequent dissemination. Advocates of modest GHG reduction have been so grateful for any information about the economic "costs of inaction" (Caccia, 1988) with which to parry the claim that mitigation would be economically ruinous that they have not scrutinized the biases of the existing damage estimates. Aside from our alarm about how this economic calculus of costs and benefits has come to be the only legitimate basis of appeal for action to slow the onset of climate change (Hajer, 1995) , we are concerned that the conservative nature of the prevailing climate change damage estimates has not been sufficiently appreciated. Some simplification is inevitable and, in fact, both necessary and desirable, if specialist knowledge is to be communicated to wider audiences. The challenge is to remain open about the often tacit assumptions and social commitments built into the technical details of scientific knowledges.
These are quite properly matters for public debate, but in the case of the last IPCC damage assessment, the boundary between objective fact and subjective value was drawn in such a way as to foreclose public discussion of important moral and political dimensions of climate change and its potential costs. To suggest that the debate over YOSL politicized "an essentially scientific process for political and ideological ends" (Pearce, 1996, page 8) is to misunderstand how deeply the politics and the economics of climate change damage assessment are intertwined. Politics do not begin (or end) with explicit policy recommendations. The very process of valuing impacts, in monetary or any other terms, is inevitably value laden and politically saturated. But monetary valuation is by no means the only way in which particular values and social commitments enter into the practice of climate change damage assessment. Indeed, the very idea of basing climate change policy upon an evaluation of economic costs and benefits is by no means self-evident. This is the brief within which Working Group Three of the IPCC operated. Thus, their frame of reference, if not their specific results, was politically constructed at the upstream end. To speak of the 'science' of economic damage assessment as if it were a separate domain exchanging independently generated ideas with policymakers is to conceal the shared commitments that define them as part of a single cultural and political order (Wynne, 1996, page 377) .
Given the immensely difficult negotiations involved with an international climate change treaty, it is enormously tempting for politicians to argue that policy must be based upon an objective scientific assessment of the economic costs and benefits, thereby absolving themselves of any responsibility to exercise discretion and leadership. Because this division of labor enhances their power and prestige, it is also attractive to the IPCC participants. But this is a dangerous strategy. It provides neither a very democratic nor an especially effective basis for crafting a political response to global climate change. It enshrines in apparent scientific objectivity the particular values embodied by the IPCC assessment. When, as is almost inevitable, these political presumptions are publicly exposed and deconstructed, there is the danger that the resulting acrimony will tend to harden positions rather than make negotiation and mutual understanding easier.
